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S O C I A L  S C I E N C E S
The limits of human predictions of recidivism
Zhiyuan “Jerry” Lin1, Jongbin Jung1, Sharad Goel1*, Jennifer Skeem2
Dressel and Farid recently found that laypeople were as accurate as statistical algorithms in predicting whether a 
defendant would reoffend, casting doubt on the value of risk assessment tools in the criminal justice system. We 
report the results of a replication and extension of Dressel and Farid’s experiment. Under conditions similar to the 
original study, we found nearly identical results, with humans and algorithms performing comparably. However, 
algorithms beat humans in the three other datasets we examined. The performance gap between humans and 
algorithms was particularly pronounced when, in a departure from the original study, participants were not 
provided with immediate feedback on the accuracy of their responses. Algorithms also outperformed humans 
when the information provided for predictions included an enriched (versus restricted) set of risk factors. These 
results suggest that algorithms can outperform human predictions of recidivism in ecologically valid settings.
INTRODUCTION
Algorithms and predictive analytics inform decisions in almost 
every sector of public policy, including criminal justice. When judges, 
correctional authorities, and parole boards make decisions regarding 
incarceration, supervision, and release, they now routinely turn 
to risk assessment instruments (RAIs), which are checklists that 
summarize “risk factors” for estimating a person’s likelihood of 
future reoffending. The chief rationale is a belief that RAIs outperform 
unaided human judgment in predicting recidivism (1, 2).
The validity of this rationale, however, has been questioned. In a 
recent high-profile study, Dressel and Farid (3) found that a widely 
used RAI called Correctional Offender Management Profiling for 
Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) “is no more accurate … than pre-
dictions made by people with little or no criminal justice expertise.” 
The authors recruited 400 online participants through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk platform to take part in their study. They showed 
each participant 50 short descriptions of real defendants drawn from a 
publicly available COMPAS dataset and asked participants to indicate 
whether they thought each defendant would commit another crime 
within 2 years. Averaging across these responses, the overall accuracy 
of participants was 62%, comparable to the accuracy of algorithmic 
COMPAS predictions (65%). [Aside from effectiveness, some have also 
questioned the equity of RAIs. See, for example, Angwin et al. (4) 
and responses to those critiques (5–9).]
However, a closer look at the Dressel and Farid study suggests 
that laypeople’s predictions were elicited in a manner that may not 
best represent unaided human judgment, particularly the kind that 
judges, probation officers, and other professionals must exercise 
when predicting reoffending in the real world. More specifically, the 
study design focused people’s attention on the most predictive factors 
and promoted learning over the course of the experiment, perhaps 
boosting accuracy rates as a result. In a new series of experiments, 
we tested the impact of three conditions on the relative accuracy of 
human judgment and RAIs in predicting reoffense. Collectively, 
these experiments were designed to illuminate both the situations 
in which humans can predict recidivism as accurately as algorithms 
and settings in which algorithms can provide better estimates than 
humans.
First, we tested the impact of providing “streamlined” versus 
“enriched” information for prediction. Dressel and Farid provided 
people with brief vignettes that listed five risk factors for recidivism 
per case in narrative form: the individual’s sex, age, current charge, 
and number of prior adult and juvenile offenses. This format mimics 
structured checklists of selective risk factors that have been shown 
to increase professionals’ ability to make accurate predictions (10). 
However, the information available in justice settings is far less 
constrained. Presentence investigation reports, attorney and victim 
impact statements, and an individual’s demeanor all add complex, 
inconsistent, risk-irrelevant, and potentially biasing information. 
We hypothesized that statistical tools predict better than humans 
when both are provided with more complex or otherwise noisy risk 
information.
We tested this hypothesis by manipulating whether streamlined 
information (Dressel and Farid’s 5 risk factors) or enriched information 
(those 5 factors plus 10 more) was provided. We ensured that all 
information was consistent and risk relevant. Given that the COMPAS 
dataset lacked these additional risk factors, we used similar datasets 
on an RAI called the “level of service inventory–revised” (LSI-R) 
(11). The LSI-R includes, for example, information on one’s criminal 
history, employment status, and substance use. For each of the 10 risk 
factors assessed by the LSI-R, we wrote phrases to describe each score 
on that factor (e.g., “has a serious drinking problem that interferes 
with work” for a substance abuse score of 3). These phrases were 
combined to create enriched vignettes that described many aspects 
of real individuals, as a contrast to streamlined vignettes that only 
described the most predictive risk factors for the same individuals.
Second, we tested the impact of providing people with feedback 
on their accuracy across a series of trials. In each of the 50 rounds of 
Dressel and Farid’s study, participants made a prediction, were 
informed whether the prediction was correct (and their cumulative 
accuracy), and then moved on to the next vignette. In other words, 
prediction events were experienced sequentially, with immediate 
feedback on accuracy. This created a “kind” environment, one 
shown to be ideal for humans to intuitively learn the probabilities of 
specific outcomes, even when the rules are not transparent (12). 
Kind environments can promote accuracy, unlike the “wicked” 
learning environments that characterize most justice settings, where 
outcomes cannot be observed immediately or are never observed at 
all (10, 13). In the absence of such feedback, we hypothesized that 
algorithms predict better than humans. We tested this hypothesis 
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by manipulating whether people were provided with feedback on their 
accuracy using both the COMPAS dataset and our LSI-R datasets.
Third, we tested the impact of base rates, a group’s overall probability 
of reoffending, on the relative predictive accuracy of algorithms and 
humans. Base rates vary substantially across contexts. For example, 
in the COMPAS data used by Dressel and Farid, the base rate of 
rearrest for any type of crime is 48%, whereas the base rate of rearrest 
for violent crime in the same dataset is only 11%. Even when people 
are explicitly told base rates, they often fail to update their prior 
beliefs, a phenomenon called “base rate neglect” (14–17). Statistical 
algorithms, in contrast, are designed to incorporate this information 
accurately and consistently. For this reason, we expect the accuracy of 
human predictions, but not the accuracy of algorithmic decisions, 
to be particularly sensitive to base rates.
There is one common exception to this expectation. People often 
do take base rates into account when the probabilities are “directly 
experienced through trial-by-trial outcome feedback” (18). Dressel 
and Farid’s feedback protocol creates this kind of intuitive learning 
environment. When feedback is provided, we thus expect the accuracy 
of humans to be substantially less sensitive to base rates. We tested 
these hypotheses by varying the base rate of recidivism in both 
the COMPAS dataset (using any versus violent rearrest) and the 
LSI-R datasets (where base rates differ by location), across feedback 
conditions.
DESIGN
Following Dressel and Farid, we recruited participants on Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk platform to estimate the likelihood that defendants 
would be rearrested within 2 years of release on the basis of brief 
descriptions of the individuals. In the original study, participants 
were simply asked for binary yes/no predictions of recidivism. We 
altered this design to instead elicit predictions on a 30-point probability 
scale. To do so, as shown in Fig. 1, we first asked participants to 
select one of six risk buckets, ranging from “almost certainly NOT 
arrested (1 to 16%)” to “almost certainly arrested (84 to 99%).” On 
the basis of this initial response, we then asked individuals to select 
one of five subcategories to obtain more specific probability estimates. 
For example, in the lowest risk bucket, the subcategories were 2, 5, 
8, 12, and 15%. Participants could not indicate exactly 50% likelihood 
of rearrest, so reported probabilities could unambiguously be converted 
to binary predictions based on a 50% probability threshold.
We extended the original study in three additional ways. First, 
whereas Dressel and Farid focused on a single dataset, we repeated 
our experiments on four: (i) COMPAS balanced base rate assessments 
of any recidivism in Broward County, FL (the dataset used by Dressel 
and Farid); (ii) COMPAS low base rate assessments of violent recidivism, 
also in Broward County; (iii) LSI-R balanced base rate assessments 
of recidivism in a midwestern state; and (iv) LSI-R low base rate 
assessments of recidivism in a southwestern state. In the first three 
datasets, “recidivism” means rearrest; in the fourth, recidivism means 
reincarceration. A summary of these four datasets is presented in 
Table 1. Second, we examined the effects of immediate feedback 
on human predictions. In the original study, participants were told 
after each prediction whether a defendant was indeed rearrested. 
We instead randomly assigned participants either to receive or not 
to receive feedback. Last, we investigated the effects of information 
richness on predictive accuracy. In the two COMPAS datasets, 
including the dataset used in the original study, relatively little 
information is available about individuals, and that which is available 
(e.g., age, gender, and number of past arrests) is strongly associated 
with recidivism risk. Vignettes based on COMPAS datasets are 
necessarily streamlined (i.e., restricted to the five risk factors available). 
However, in the two LSI-R datasets, we have more complete information 
on each individual, including 10 additional risk factors related, for 
example, to education, employment, and substance use. Vignettes 
based on LSI-R datasets can be streamlined like those presented in 
the original study or enriched with descriptions containing more 
detailed information.
In summary, we carried out four separate experiments, one for 
each of the four datasets that we considered. In the two COMPAS 
experiments, participants were randomly assigned to receive or not 
to receive feedback. In the two LSI-R experiments, participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the two feedback conditions and 
independently assigned to see streamlined or enriched vignettes, in 
a 2 by 2 design. In all cases, participants provided 50 predictions 
and received financial compensation for accuracy, in line with the 
original study. In aggregate, across all the experiments, we collected 
32,250 responses from 645 participants.
RESULTS
As detailed below, we compared human predictions of recidivism 
to those from existing tools (COMPAS and LSI-R); we also fit our 
own statistical models to the data as another point of comparison. 
Predictions from existing tools and our own models were restricted 
to providing responses on the same 30-point probability scale available 
to study participants. Similar to Dressel and Farid, we quantified 
performance both in terms of binary classification accuracy, which 
we henceforth simply call “classification accuracy,” and ranking 
accuracy, as measured, in part, by the area under the receiver operating 
characteristic curve [commonly called “area under the curve” (AUC)].
Classification accuracy
Figure 2 shows the classification accuracy of study participants (with 
and without feedback), existing tools, and our own statistical models. 
In particular, the solid circle in the leftmost panel corresponds to 
the setting considered in Dressel and Farid: the COMPAS dataset, 
with immediate feedback provided to participants. In line with that 
study, we found that participants performed on par with the COMPAS 
algorithm and with our own logistic regression model: 64% accuracy 
for participants; 65% for COMPAS, indicated by the dashed line; 
and 68% for our model, indicated by the red square. Furthermore, 
even without immediate feedback (open circle, 62%), the study 
participants did reasonably well. We were thus largely able to replicate 
the main result reported by Dressel and Farid despite some differences 
in experiment design (e.g., we elicited probability judgments rather 
than binary predictions). See also tables S1 to S3 for further statistical 
comparisons between the accuracy of humans and algorithms.
However, we saw qualitatively different patterns in the three other 
datasets that we considered. In those datasets, as shown in Fig. 2, 
study participants performed consistently worse than both the 
existing RAIs (COMPAS and LSI-R) and our own logistic regression 
models, with a particularly large performance gap when feedback 
was not provided. For example, in the COMPAS low base rate dataset, 
COMPAS and our logistic regression model both achieved 89% 
classification accuracy, but participants attained only 83% accuracy 
when provided with feedback, and participants attained only 60% 
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Fig. 1. Sample vignettes. The top and bottom panels provide examples of streamlined and enriched vignettes, respectively. Participants assessed the likelihood of 
re-arrest on a 30-point scale, as shown in each panel.
Table 1. Characteristics of the four datasets that we considered. BR, base rate. 
COMPAS balanced BR COMPAS low BR LSI-R balanced BR LSI-R low BR
Number of cases 1000 1000 311 1954
BR of recidivism 48% 11% 29% 9%
Features Streamlined Streamlined Streamlined/enriched Streamlined/enriched
Number of responses  
(no feedback) 2700 2400 2850/2500 2850/2900
Number of responses 
(feedback) 2400 3000 2700/2400 3000/2550
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accuracy without feedback. Figure S3 shows that classification accuracy 
improved over time when feedback was provided, but performance 
did not improve fast enough for participants to be competitive with 
the existing tools or our statistical models. (To adjust for these 
learning gains, in the feedback condition, we report accuracy on the 
final 10 of the 50 questions answered by a participant.)
The effect of feedback on participants’ performance appears 
most pronounced in the datasets with relatively low base rates of 
recidivism. In the COMPAS balanced base rate data used by Dressel 
and Farid, 48% of defendants recidivated. In comparison, base rates 
are 11, 9, and 29% in the COMPAS low base rate, LSI-R low base 
rate, and LSI-R balanced base rate datasets, respectively. In these 
latter three datasets, participants consistently overestimated risk, 
hurting their classification accuracy (see fig. S4 and table S3), despite 
the fact that study participants were explicitly and repeatedly informed 
of the lower base rates, as shown in Fig. 1.
Last, and in contrast to providing feedback, we found that providing 
enriched information for predictions had minimal effect on classification 
accuracy. As shown in Fig. 2 for the two LSI-R datasets, both human 
participants and our own statistical models showed little to no 
improvement in classification accuracy when given more information on 
which to base judgments, in the enriched condition (see also table S5).
Ranking accuracy
Classification accuracy is a useful starting point, but it can also be a 
problematic measure of performance in unbalanced datasets. For 
example, in the COMPAS low base rate dataset (with 11% recidivism), 
COMPAS and our own statistical model have about the same accuracy 
as a naive classifier that predicts that no one recidivates, although 
human participants performed considerably worse than even this 
simple classifier. We thus next gauge performance in terms of AUC, 
a popular measure that mitigates this issue of class imbalance. 
Loosely, AUC measures the extent to which predictions correctly 
rank individuals by risk, ignoring the absolute stated risk level. To 
more formally define AUC, suppose, in a given dataset, that X1 is a 
randomly selected individual who ultimately recidivates and X0 is a 
randomly selected individual who ultimately does not. Then, AUC 
is Pr (r(X1) ≥ r(X0)), where r(x) is the reported probability that x 
recidivates.
Figure 3 shows the ranking accuracy of existing tools, our own 
statistical models, and human predictions without feedback, as measured 
by AUC for the two LSI-R datasets, where the enriched condition is 
available. We restrict our attention to the no-feedback condition 
because humans with feedback update their estimates of base rates 
over time (fig. S3), making it difficult to accurately assess risk rankings 
since the scale of predictions changes across responses. We found 
that study participants had worse ranking accuracy than the LSI-R 
RAI. (We saw similar results for the two COMPAS datasets, as shown 
in fig. S1.) Furthermore, as was the case for classification accuracy, in 
Fig. 2, humans showed little to no improvement in ranking accuracy 
when provided with enriched information (see also table S2).
Our logistic regression model, however, did improve in ranking 
accuracy when provided with more information, a pattern that was 
not apparent when performance was measured via classification 
accuracy, as shown in Fig. 2. In the LSI-R datasets, very few individ-
uals have estimated likelihood of recidivism that exceeds 50%, so 
the optimal binary prediction is “no recidivism” in almost every 
case, even when provided with the enriched information. For this 
reason, classification accuracy is too coarse a measure to reveal the 
value of additional information. Ranking accuracy, in contrast, 
allows for more nuanced distinctions among predictions, which, in 
turn, reveals the gap between risk assessments based on streamlined 
and enriched information (see table S5).
Our findings further suggest that humans perform relatively well 
when a very limited amount of information is sufficient to create 
accurate risk rankings. For example, when age and number of past 
offenses is all one needs to assess risk, it is reasonable that appropriately 
motivated humans can compete with statistical models. In the cases 
that we consider, human participants generally performed on par 
with our logistic regression models that were based on limited 
information, in the streamlined condition, but when more information 
was useful, the models appropriately incorporated that information 
while the human participants often did not, as seen in the enriched 
condition. In both panels of Fig. 3, the gap between humans and the 
logistic regression models is wider in the enriched condition (see 
also table S4).
Last, we took a complementary, cost-benefit approach to assess 
ranking performance. Suppose that a policy-maker aims to allocate 
limited resources (e.g., community supervision) to those individuals 
deemed most likely to recidivate. To assess the performance of 
different ranking strategies, one can compute the proportion of 
recidivists that are listed in the top p-percent of candidates in each 
COMPAS balanced BR COMPAS low BR LSI-R balanced BR LSI-R low BR
Streamlined Streamlined Streamlined Enriched Streamlined Enriched
40%
60%
80%
Cl
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With feedback No feedback Logistic regression Existing tool
Fig. 2. Classification accuracy of human predictions, statistical models, and existing tools. Classification accuracy is shown for (i) human predictions, with and without 
immediate feedback; (ii) a logistic regression model that we trained using the same information provided to study participants; and (iii) the existing tools, COMPAS or 
LSI-R. For participants in the feedback condition, only the last 10 responses for each participant were used, to account for the effects of learning. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals and are typically smaller than the height of red squares for the logistic regression models.
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strategy. (This measure is also known as “recall at p” in the machine 
learning literature.) Figure 4 traces out the corresponding curves 
for humans and algorithms in our experiments, for all values of 
p from 0 to 100% on the horizontal axis. As with our AUC analysis, 
we restricted to study participants who did not receive feedback. In 
line with those results above, we found that study participants in 
the streamlined condition generally performed on par with existing 
tools and with our own statistical models but that algorithms 
outperformed humans when more information was available. For 
example, in the LSI low base rate dataset in the enriched condition, 
the top 50% of individuals deemed riskiest by study participants in 
reality contained 58% of recidivists in the dataset, just slightly better 
than random. In comparison, the top 50% deemed riskiest by LSI-R 
and our own statistical model contained 74 and 80% of recidivists, 
respectively. Similarly, in the LSI balanced base rate dataset in the 
enriched condition, the top 50% deemed riskiest by study participants 
contained 57% of recidivists, while LSI-R and our own statistical 
model contained 62 and 66%, respectively. For further details, 
see table S6.
DISCUSSION
Risk assessment is “the engine that drives” a federal prison reform 
bill recently signed into law (19) and a component of many jurisdictions’ 
efforts to reduce incarceration rates without compromising public 
safety (20). When risk is a legally relevant factor, judges, correctional 
authorities, and other professionals have been advised to consider 
RAIs when making decisions. The assumption is that RAIs predict 
reoffending better than unaided human judgment.
Dressel and Farid’s findings challenge this assumption in a setting 
where risk information is constrained, feedback on accuracy is provided 
across many trials, and base rates of recidivism are balanced. In the 
present series of experiments, we examined the robustness of that 
result by manipulating these three features. We replicated Dressel 
and Farid’s finding that people perform as well as algorithms under 
the conditions that they investigate. However, we also found that 
algorithms tended to outperform humans in settings where decision- 
makers have access to extensive information and do not receive 
immediate feedback and base rates are far from balanced, features 
of many real-world scenarios.
In general, our findings are consistent with much of the past 
research comparing human and algorithmic decisions (21–23); for 
crime-specific reviews, see (24, 25). For example, on the basis of a 
meta-analysis of 41 studies, Ægisdóttir et al. (21) found that statistical 
methods were reliably superior to humans in predicting a range 
of outcomes. For predicting violence and other criminal behavior 
specifically, they note that algorithms were “clearly superior to the 
clinical [human] approach.” Similarly, several studies conducted 
with judges and correctional officers indicate that algorithms and 
RAIs outperform their professional judgment in predicting recidivism 
[cf. Goel et al. (26) for an overview].
Against this backdrop, Dressel and Farid’s finding was unexpected. 
Their work, however, helps provide hints about the conditions 
under which humans may perform as accurately as algorithmic 
RAIs. Although we could not examine every possibility in our 
experiments, our results point toward two sets of conditions that 
influence the relative accuracy of humans. First, when base rates are 
unbalanced, our results suggest that providing people with feedback 
can improve their classification accuracy to rival that of algorithms. 
We explicitly informed all participants in our experiments about 
the base rate of recidivism, but classification accuracy improved 
only among the subset of participants who also received trial-by-trial 
outcome feedback. Across trials, people who received feedback, 
compared to those who did not, became less likely to guess that an 
individual would reoffend.
In justice settings, this feedback is exceedingly rare. Judges may 
never find out what happens to individuals that they sentence or for 
whom they set bail. Theoretically, jurisdictions could address this 
gap and create a more kind learning environment by requiring that 
judges express and record their intuitive estimates of risk and by 
providing regular feedback on past predictions. With that information, 
judges could, for example, see the actual postrelease recidivism rate 
of those that they had deemed “high risk.” As in our experiments, 
this feedback could correct tendencies to overpredict recidivism. 
Improving judges’ ranking accuracy, however, could prove more 
difficult.
Second, our results suggest that people can predict recidivism 
as well as statistical models if only a few simple predictive factors are 
specified as inputs, as was the case in Dressel and Farid’s study. In 
this context of streamlined inputs, the accuracy of models and 
humans (without feedback) was largely interchangeable. In contrast, 
when inputs were enriched with additional predictive factors, models 
outperformed human judgment. This was not because the additional 
risk information compromised human judgment (people’s performance 
did not differ much in streamlined versus enriched conditions). 
Instead, it was because models made better use of the additional 
information than did humans.
We note, however, that even in the enriched condition, the 
additional information that we provided was still relevant for 
recidivism prediction, as it was included in the LSI-R risk assessment 
tool. Like Dressel and Farid’s study, then, our experiments compare 
the accuracy of algorithms and RAIs with that of structured human 
judgment, which has been found to consistently outperform un-
structured judgment in predicting violence and other recidivism 
[cf. Goel et al. (26) for a summary]. To better represent human 
judgment in justice settings, we hope that future studies provide 
even more realistic and complete inputs for prediction, including 
irrelevant or potentially distracting information (27). Still, together 
with past work, our results support the claim that algorithmic 
risk assessments can often outperform human predictions of 
reoffending.
LSI-R balanced BR LSI-R low BR
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Fig. 3. Ranking accuracy of human predictions, statistical models, and existing 
tools. Ranking accuracy, as measured by AUC, is shown for (i) human predictions 
without feedback, (ii) logistic regression models that use the same information 
provided to study participants, and (iii) the existing LSI-R tools. Error bars indicate 
95% confidence intervals.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Datasets
Our two COMPAS experiments were based on a single dataset that 
is composed of 7214 defendants from Broward County, FL (4) who 
were scored with COMPAS for both risk of recidivism and risk 
of violent recidivism. While the Dressel and Farid (3) study only 
considered human predictions of overall recidivism, we additionally 
considered predictions of violent recidivism. The COMPAS dataset 
contains individual-level demographic information (age and gender); 
criminal history (current charge and number of past arrests); and 
whether or not each defendant was arrested for a new crime or, 
separately, a new violent crime within 2 years of COMPAS scoring, 
excluding any initial detention period. We restrict to the same 
randomly selected subset of 1000 defendants used by Dressel and 
Farid.
We also made use of two LSI-R (11) datasets: one containing 311 
individuals under correctional supervision, drawn from Lowenkamp 
and Latessa (28), and another containing 1954 individuals on 
probation, drawn from Flores et al. (29). These datasets include 
numerical scores for 10 risk factors or subscales of the LSI-R (e.g., 
criminal history, antisocial peers, and substance use). All individuals 
in these datasets were followed for a minimum of 1 year after the 
LSI-R was administered to assess recidivism, which was for any 
arrest in the correctional supervision dataset and any reincarceration 
(a low base rate phenomenon) in the probation dataset.
Vignettes
For the COMPAS data, we generated short vignettes to show study 
participants following the method of Dressel and Farid. In particular, 
participants were given a brief description of each individual’s age, 
gender, current criminal charge, and number of past arrests. For the 
LSI-R data, we first created several one-sentence descriptions for 
each of the 10 LSI-R factors and risk levels, discretized to “low,” 
“medium,” and “high.” For example, one such sentence for low risk 
on the criminal history scale was “He has never been convicted of a 
prior offense.” These sentences were created by consulting the 
LSI-R scoring manuals for each jurisdiction. Participants in the 
streamlined condition were presented with the individual’s age, 
gender, and number of past arrests, as in the COMPAS experiments. 
(Current charge was not available in the LSI-R datasets.) Participants 
assigned to the enriched condition were shown a brief paragraph 
describing an individual’s age and gender, followed by one-sentence 
descriptions for each of the 10 LSI-R risk factors, displayed in 
random order.
Participants
Study participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk. The study was advertised as follows: “You are invited to 
participate in a research study on predicting criminal behavior. You will 
be presented with a series of descriptions that requires a classification 
decision (e.g., assessing an individual’s risk of recidivism). We will 
not ask or record any personal information.” Each participant was 
asked to assess the recidivism risk for 50 individuals randomly 
selected from the corresponding dataset. As in Dressel and Farid (3), 
we additionally asked participants to answer two attention checks at 
different points in the experiment, and we only included responses 
from the 71% of participants who passed both attention checks in 
our analysis. Our four experiments were conducted in close succession 
over the course of several weeks, and participants were only allowed 
to complete one experiment.
COMPAS balanced BR COMPAS low BR LSI-R balanced BR LSI-R low BR
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Fig. 4. An alternative measure of ranking accuracy. Proportion of people who recidivated that were identified when ranking by the risk assessments of humans in the 
no-feedback condition, a logistic regression model, and existing tools (COMPAS or LSI-R). For each value p on the horizontal axis, the vertical axis shows the proportion 
of all recidivists that are included among the p-percent of the population deemed riskiest. Human performance was generally comparable to algorithmic tools in the 
streamlined condition (top), but algorithmic tools outperformed humans when more information was made available [enriched condition, (bottom)].
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Each participant received $1 for completing the study and a bonus 
of up to $5 based on performance. Following previous work (30), 
we measured performance via Brier scoring, an incentive-compatible 
payment scheme for eliciting probabilities (31–33). For each question 
i, the Brier score is 1 − (Yi − pi)2, where pi is the probability of recidivism 
reported by the participant, Yi = 1 if the individual described was 
indeed arrested for a new (violent) crime within 2 years of release, 
and Yi = 0 otherwise. A participant’s final score was computed by 
summing the Brier scores earned for the 50 substantive questions, 
excluding the two attention checks. Across participants and experiments, 
the average hourly compensation was approximately $25.
Statistical models
For comparison to the existing tools (COMPAS and LSI-R), we fit 
logistic regression models on the same data that were made available 
to human participants. In the case of the COMPAS datasets, we 
used a separate training set of 6214 cases, which is the remainder 
after excluding the 1000 cases used as test data. For the LSI-R datasets, 
we used leave-one-out evaluation over all available data. Probabilistic 
predictions from the models were then rounded to the nearest value 
of the 30-point scale presented to participants in our experiment to 
ensure that the statistical models were evaluated under the same 
technical constraints.
Computing AUC
To compute AUC for human predictions, we first calculated the 
AUC for each study participant and then averaged these results 
across all participants in a given dataset and treatment condition. 
We noted that Dressel and Farid collected only binary predictions, 
rather than probability estimates, from participants and, therefore, 
could not report AUC in this manner. Instead, for each vignette, they 
first computed the proportion of participants who predicted the 
individual would recidivate and then computed AUC across the set 
of vignettes on the basis of these proportions. Accordingly, the 
AUC values reported by Dressel and Farid represent the “wisdom 
of the crowd,” which often exceeds the average performance of 
individuals (34, 35).
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Supplementary material for this article is available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/cgi/
content/full/6/7/eaaz0652/DC1
Fig. S1. Ranking performance of human predictions, statistical models, and existing tools.
Fig. S2. A comparison between the classification accuracy of humans and existing tools.
Fig. S3. Average classification accuracy over time with feedback.
Fig. S4. Calibration plot for human responses.
Table S1. Relative classification accuracy of humans without feedback.
Table S2. Relative classification accuracy of humans with feedback.
Table S3. Relative classification accuracy of humans with and without feedback.
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Table S5. Relative performance of humans and models in the streamlined and enriched 
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